role of group-based hatred in inducing political intolerance is more substantial in the face of heightened existential threat and among unsophisticated individuals than among sophisticated ones.
KEY WORDS: Group-based hatred, Political intolerance, Emotions, Perceived threat, Political sophistication Even in seemingly stable democratic regimes widespread nondemocratic attitudes and practices create fertile ground for nondemocratic legislation and the realization of discriminatory policies (Gibson, 2006) . Since Stouffer's seminal work ([1955] 1992) , there has been substantial agreement among political scientists that political intolerance towards minority groups is the most prominent expression of such problematic attitudes. Political intolerance-the support or willingness to denounce the basic political rights of individuals who belong to a defined outgroup in a particular society-contradicts basic democratic values of equal rights and political opportunity.
Despite widespread acknowledgment of the importance of equality, medium to high levels of political intolerance towards various minority groups have been traced in many old (e.g., Sullivan, Walsh, Shamir, Barnum, & Gibson, 1993) as well as new (Gibson & Duch, 1993) democracies. It seems that intolerance is a deeply rooted problem, shared by most democratic cultures. From the individual's perspective, granting political opportunities to the opposition or "enemy" outgroup contradicts basic human instincts. In other words, tolerance is an ambivalent phenomenon since "it implies a willingness to permit the expression of ideas or interests that one opposes" (Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus, 1979, p. 784) . Therefore, as maintained by Kuklinski, Riggle, Ottati, Schwarz and Wyer (1991) , political tolerance is a continuing confrontation between "gut feelings" and ideologies or cognitions.
Nevertheless, most studies which have examined antecedents of political intolerance have ignored the potential role played by negative emotions in endorsing those attitudes. In general, most scholars have concentrated instead on the levels of perceived threat (Stephan & Stephan, 2001) , ideologies, values, and democratic principles (Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus, 1982) , personal characteristics like authoritarianism (Duckitt, 1993) or locus of control (Halperin, CanettiNisim, & Pedahzur, 2007) , socioeconomic status (Quillian, 1995) or religious beliefs (Eisenstein, 2006) as the central antecedents of exclusionary attitudes and political intolerance (see for reviews: Gibson, 2006; Sullivan & Transue, 1999) .
At the same time, in recent years, political scientists in general and political psychologists in particular have shifted the focus of explaining political phenomena from the purely cognitive perspective to an integrated emotion-cognition one (Marcus, 2003) . In addition, it can be assumed that the continuing waves of immigration and terror attacks, which have presented challenges to western democracies, have further emphasized the role of negative emotions in the development of nondemocratic attitudes. As a result of those trends, a number of studies have examined the relations between affect or emotions and political intolerance (e.g., Kuklinski et al., 1991; Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse, & Stevens, 2005; Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse, & Wood, 1995; Skitka, Bauman, & Mullen, 2004 ).
Yet even these important studies suffer from shortcomings, mostly related to lack of detailed differentiation between discrete emotions, distinct contexts, and differences in the characteristics of the intolerant individuals. Most importantly, the lion's share of studies on emotions and political intolerance has focused on fear (or anxiety) and anger as the two most significant emotional determinants of intolerance (see Capelos & Van Troost, 2007; Skitka et al., 2004) . Recently, Marcus, Neuman, and Mackuen (2000) have noted the absence of more in-depth studies on negative emotions (e.g., disgust, hatred, anger). Halperin and CanettiNisim (2007) pointed to the unique role of one of the pivotal negative emotionshatred-in explaining various political behaviors. Therefore, we would like to suggest that in addition to other negative emotions, hatred should be tested as another emotional predictor of political intolerance.
Beyond our ability to point to the role of discrete negative emotions in inducing political intolerance, questions should be raised regarding the stability of these affects in different contexts and in reference to different individuals. More specifically, previous studies have shown that the dynamic of public opinion is different in wartime and in no-war/routine periods (see Arian & Olzaeker, 1999) . In addition, scholars have showed the distinct influence of emotions on political decision-making processes among sophisticated and unsophisticated individuals (Geva & Sirtin, 2006) .
Hence, the main goal of the current study is to create a deeper understanding regarding the role of discrete negative emotions in increasing political intolerance among different groups of individuals in different contexts. More specifically, the goals of this study are: (a) to point to the specific effects of group-based hatred, anger, and fear on political intolerance; (b) to reveal the distinct impact of those emotions on political intolerance among politically sophisticated and unsophisticated individuals; and (c) to compare the effect of emotion on political intolerance in times of war and no-war/routine.
The Emotional Sources of Political Intolerance: A Critical Review

Hatred: Negative Emotions and Political Intolerance
Emotions play an important role in many aspects of life including the social and political realm (de Rivera, 1992; Marcus & Mackuen, 1993) . Emotions are defined as an individual's investment of resources which develops in reaction to a cognitive appraisal of an external or internal stimulus and subsequently creates a motivation to take action until there is a return to the "balanced" relationship between the individual and his/her environment (Frijda, 1986) . Most contempo-rary scholars of emotion see it as a multidimensional process which involves conscious or unconscious cognitive appraisal, a pivotal component of affect and at least some behavioral aspects (Scherer, 2004) .
The behavioral aspect of emotion creates the basis for its potential influence on political intolerance. It gives expression to individuals' adapted reaction to the change that stimulated the emotion and hence serves to sum up the motivations for the whole emotional process (see Frijda, 2004; Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989) . Arnold (1960) suggested that each emotion is related to a specific response tendency. More than two decades later, Frijda (1986) pointed to action "readinesses" that are typical of 17 discrete emotions (see also Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989) . Roseman (1984 Roseman ( , 1994 has distinguished between actions, action tendencies, and emotional goals. Yet, since the realization of the desired action is dependent upon numerous external factors, it is common today to see emotional goals and action tendencies as the inherent behavioral aspect of each and every emotion (Lang, 1988; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987) .
In general, all negative emotions are related to the willingness to create some kind of change in the environment. Yet negative emotions differ from each other in the specific kind of change they endorse. Previous empirical studies have pointed to the distinct response tendencies and emotional goals of different individual negative emotions (Frijda et al., 1989; Roseman, 2002) as well as group-based negative emotions (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus, & Gordin, 2003) . Hence, it can be assumed that despite many similarities between negative emotions, some would be more related to intolerance than others. In order to identify those differential effects, a deeper understanding regarding the nature and the distinct behavioral aspect of each of these emotions is required.
Fear is an aversive emotion which arises in situations of perceived threat or danger to people and their society and enables them to respond to these threats adaptively (Gray, 1987) . It is frequently accompanied by perceptions of low coping potential and relative weakness (Roseman, 1984) and by physiological symptoms of increased heartbeat and perspiration (Rime, Philippot, & Cisamolo, 1990) . The behavioral aspect of fear has been found to be related to the goal of creating a safer environment and to an avoidance or distancing tendency, which translates into a willingness to prevent any social contact with the fear generator (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Frijda et al., 1989) . Consequently, we argue that this behavioral aspect does not imply a direct relationship between fear and political intolerance.
Previous political studies further strengthen that assumption. In general, most studies point to the important role of fear and anxiety in political information processes and decision making (Marcus & Mackuen, 1993; Huddy, Feldman, Taber, & Lahav, 2005) . In addition, fear was found to be related to pessimistic risk estimates and ingroup improvement (Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Skitka et al., 2004 ). Yet, most studies do not point to direct relations between fear and intolerance (for review, see Capelos & Van Troost, 2007) . On the other hand, empirical evidence does exist about the effect of fear on intolerance through the mediation of variables such as perceived threat, outgroup derogation, or democratic principles (Gibson & Bingham, 1982; Marcus et al., 1995; Skitka et al., 2004) .
Anger is a socially constructed emotion which is evoked in events in which the individual perceives other individuals' or groups' actions as unjust, unfair, or as a deviation from acceptable societal norms (Averill, 1982) . It involves appraisals of relative strength and high coping potential (Mackie et al., 2000) as well as physiological symptoms of high body temperature and increase in heartbeat (Roseman & Evdokas, 2004) . Within the public sphere, anger has been found to be related to optimistic risk estimates and to the support of initiated actions, even if they carry risk (Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Skitka et al., 2004) . In many cases anger is associated with aggressive behavior (Berkowitz, 1993) or attack action tendencies (Roseman, 2002) , and hence, its potential relation to political intolerance seems intuitive.
Nonetheless, caution is called for. As in the case of fear, empirical studies do not point to direct relations between anger and intolerance (e.g., Skitka et al., 2004) . Moreover, a recent empirical study conducted by Fischer and Roseman (2007) has shown that the emotional goals underlying anger focus on the willingness to gain a better outcome or improve the behavior of the object, and not necessarily to hurt it (see also Roseman, Copeland, & Fischer, 2003) . According to this perspective, the aggressive action tendencies associated with anger are only one out of a group of alternative solutions. For example, Halperin (2008) has pointed to close relations between group-based anger and the support of educational policy in order to change outgroup perceptions. It seems that anger leads to political intolerance only in very specific cases. Skitka et al. (2004) found that this influence is mediated mainly by moral outrage and outgroup derogation.
We now introduce another emotional factor which has been overlooked in the literature on political intolerance: hatred. We argue that hatred is key to the understanding of political intolerance. We do not argue that other negative emotions-anger and fear-are unimportant but rather that they have a limited capacity to account for political intolerance; they will be conducive when hatred comes into play as a mediator.
Hatred is an extreme and continuous emotion which rejects a person or a group in a generalized and totalistic fashion (Ben-Zeev, 1992) . It involves a restricted amount of negative feeling as well as a stable, wide cognitive spectrum which produces an absolute separation/division between outgroup members and ingroup members (Bartlett, 2005) . Hatred is provoked as a result of recurrent offenses committed against individuals or their group: offenses which are perceived as intentional and as stemming from the stable, evil character of the hated individual or group (Halperin, 2008; Royzman, McCauley, & Rosin, 2005; Sternberg, 2003) . Therefore, unlike fear or anger, 1 which are targeted at specific actions, hatred is targeted at the fundamental characteristics of the individual or the group (Ben-Zeev, 1992; Ortony et al., 1988) . In other words, haters do not believe in any possibility of improving intergroup relations. As a result, hatred gives expression to the dismissal of any attempt to change the hated individual or group; indeed, hatred consists of a willingness to harm and even annihilate the other (Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005; Halperin, 2008) .
There is no empirical evidence regarding the influence of hatred on intolerance. Yet following the characteristics of hatred that have just been described, we suggest that political intolerance be seen as the political translation of the behavioral aspect of hatred. Thus, we suggest that hatred will be a strong predictor of political intolerance, above and beyond other negative emotions (Hypothesis 1). Furthermore, relying on previous findings (e.g., Capelos & Van Troost, 2007; Gibson & Bingham, 1982; Marcus et al., 1995; Skitka et al., 2004) regarding the indirect effect of fear and anger on political intolerance, and based upon the close relations between hatred and these emotions (see Sternberg, 2003) , we predict that fear and anger will have indirect effects-via hatred-on political intolerance (Hypothesis 2).
Political Sophistication: Negative Emotions and Political Intolerance
Presuming that discrete negative emotions and political intolerance are connected, it is important to examine whether these associations are moderated by the level of political sophistication. Despite its central role in political science (Sniderman, Brody, & Tetlock, 1991) , there is no consensus regarding the definition of political sophistication (Luskin, 1987) . Krosnick (1990) argued that political sophistication is a multidimensional concept which involves a variety of overlapping skills. Luskin (1990) mentioned three main elements-exposure to political information, intellectual capacity, and efforts to obtain and understand political information-as the cornerstones of political sophistication. For the modest purposes of the current work, we use the broadest definition, according to which political sophistication is "the range of factual information about politics that is stored in long-term memory" (Goren, 2001, p. 161) .
Political sophistication has been found to have a large impact on political processes of decision making (Luskin, 1987) . It is closely related to level of education as well as to cognitive capabilities; it directs the dynamic and process of political decision making. Recently, in a study of American voters, Gomez and Wilson (2001) found that individuals at various levels of political sophistication cognitively engage in politics in different ways, using heterogeneous decision rules in processing political information and making political choices.
A more "emotionally focused" argument was made by Rahn (2000) , showing that the role of "public mood" in political reasoning is much more substantial among the less politically informed than among more sophisticated individuals. Those findings and others (Redlawsk & Lau, 2003) lend credence to the sophistication-interaction hypothesis, first presented by Sniderman et al. (1991) , according to which the less sophisticated make more frequent use of their emotions in establishing their political views about issues, groups, and leaders.
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Decisions about whether to support granting political rights to "outgroup" members do not differ from other political decisions; it is thus assumed that sophistication will moderate attitudes that influence such decision making. Zinni, Mattei, and Rhodebeck (1997) have examined the applicability of that assumption to intergroup relations and found that while sophisticated individuals tend to use ideology as the most important basis for their attitudes towards outgroups, emotions about the outgroup were more important among the unsophisticated. Following the abovementioned theoretical and empirical studies (Luskin, 1987; Redlawsk & Lau, 2003; Sniderman et al. 1991) , we may assume that political sophistication will moderate the effect of hatred on political intolerance (Hypothesis 3).
Existential Insecurity, Negative Emotions, and Political Intolerance
We are interested in the bigger question of why some people who live in the shadow of violence and war employ extreme political views whereas others seek conciliatory modes. With the recent reemergence of terrorism, there is a growing scholarly interest in people's psychological and political reactions to outgroups in the face of terror, war, and violence (e.g., Canetti-Nisim, Ariely, & Halperin, 2007; Inglehart, Moaddel, & Tessler, 2006) . In this paper, we focus specifically on emotional explanations in the context of intergroup relations. The dynamic of the development of intergroup attitudes and emotions is always dependent upon the environmental, societal, and psychological context (Bar-Tal, Halperin, & de-Rivera, 2007) . A context of extreme threat, such as war and terror attacks, creates a highly challenging setting for democracies.
Political tolerance is important for the functioning of pluralistic societies and is put to the test mainly in extremely stressful situations (Skitka et al., 2004) . In those situations, the inherent tension between democratic norms and security concerns appears in its most destructive configuration. Studies conducted in the United States, Israel, and even in the Iraqi arena have shown that an impulse to prevent minority groups from having social and political rights is one of the most immediate reactions of individuals to terror attacks and war Huddy, Khatid, & Capelos, 2002; Inglehart et al., 2006; Shamir & SagivSchifter, 2006) .
It is well established that perceived threat is the most important predictor of intolerance (Sullivan et al., 1982) . That robust finding is rooted in "realistic group conflict theory" (Sherif, 1966) , which shows that incompatible goals and interests (i.e., economic, security, property) are the main causes of intergroup hostility. Hence, we know that insecurity and related stress induce intolerance but we do not clearly know why. To our knowledge, only one study (Shamir & Sagiv-Schifter, 2006 ) has compared the relative impact of the predictors of political intolerance in times of high stress (war, terror attacks) and routine/rest. Yet even in that study, discrete negative emotions were not tested as part of the repertoire of potential predictors of intolerance. We do know, however, that under stressful conditions emotions become more extreme and, in many cases, their effect on attitudes and behavior is more central (Huddy, Feldman, & Cassese, 2007; Skitka et al., 2004) . It can be assumed, therefore, that the relative weight of the emotional aspect in inducing political intolerance might be higher in times of war in comparison to quiet periods. This leads to the hypothesis that existential insecurity will moderate the effect of hatred on political intolerance (Hypothesis 4).
Political Intolerance in a Multiethnic Society
We turn now to political intolerance in Israel. Israel is a multi-ethnic and deeply divided society with multiple social and political schisms and a multiparty system (Horowitz & Lissak, 1990 ). Israel's societal infrastructure is highly influenced by the protracted conflict with the Arab world in general and with the Palestinians in particular (Bar-Tal, 2007) . As a result of these multiple schisms and conflict, scholars often see Israeli society as the ultimate laboratory for the study of political intolerance (see Shamir & Sagiv-Schifter, 2006; Sullivan et al., 1993) .
Following decades of Israeli-Arab conflict, Palestinian citizens of Israel (hereafter PCIs)-who constitute 19% of the population-are a major target of political intolerance (Shamir & Sagiv-Schifter, 2006; Sullivan, Shamir, Walsh, & Roberts, 1985) . In contrast to other minorities, PCIs-albeit more fans than players in the recent skirmishes between Jews and Palestinians-are perceived to be a hostile minority with intimate connections with the enemies of Israel (Smooha, 2002) . Jewish Israeli society is also characterized by a pluralistic model of political intolerance (Sullivan, Marcus, Feldman, & Piereson, 1981; Sullivan et al., 1982) . Studies show expressions of negative attitudes towards a whole range of groups (e.g., leftists, extreme rightists (settlers), ultra-orthodox, new immigrants, labor migrants; see Canetti-Nisim & Pedahzur, 2003; Pedahzur & Yishai, 1999; Sullivan et al., 1993) . Although this study does not address it directly, the question of pluralistic intolerance forms an important part of the backdrop to a discussion of viable democracy in Israel, including whether the system is resistant to antidemocratic challenges.
Method
Sampling and Samples Characteristics
Data were collected from four representative samples of Israeli adults-two waves of a panel design and two cross-sectional surveys (see Table 1 ). An identical study design was administered in all four samples. Interviews were conducted by individuals at two survey institutes in Israel-Machshov Institute and the University of Haifa survey center-who were experienced in telephone survey methodology. Questionnaires were translated into Russian and carefully back-translated. 3 Interviews were conducted by fluent speakers of Hebrew or Russian. All scales within the questionnaires were previously used in prior research and were found to have good reliability and construct validity. The institutional review boards of the University of Haifa and Kent State University approved the study, and oral informed consent was obtained from study participants.
We randomly called landlines to obtain representative samples of Jews living in Israel at the time of the surveys. The final interviewed samples included (847(1); 457(2); 509(3); 807(4)) individuals who could be reached and who agreed to participate, yielding a final response rate of more than 40% and a cooperation rate of more than 50% in all four surveys. This compared favorably with studies in the United States, especially given that the dialing methods in Israel, unlike the United States, include business phones (approximately 10%), which are treated as a failed attempt, and that the higher rates in U.S. studies typically do not include nonanswered phones (Galea et al., 2002) . Allowing for business lines, which in Israel cannot be removed as in the United States, gives us a corrected response rate of 45%. The samples corresponded with the distribution of the Israeli-Jewish population (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2006). (Brader, 2005; Roseman, Abelson, & Ewing, 1986) and in Israel (Marmur & Weimann, 2001 ) have shown that during political campaigns the public sphere is saturated with positive and negative emotions. Given the prominence of emotions in politics and the highly emotional character of campaigns, the political role of hatred during election campaigns bears close examination. 4 The panel design consisted of two prospective surveys that were conducted between December 2005 and January 2006 (Survey 1) and in March 2006 (Survey 2). The first survey was conducted at the beginning of the parliamentary election campaign and the follow-up survey done during the last days of the campaign. In terms of security, this period was not particularly turbulent, with no major terror or missile attacks targeted at Israel. Two major events did take place just prior to the 2006 elections: first, the unilateral withdrawal from Gaza and north Samaria, namely, the removal and relocation of two dozen settlements and ten thousand residents; second, the sudden hospitalization of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. Not surprisingly, emotions were at their peak at the beginning of the campaign rather than in its final stages. Both Jewish and Palestinian citizens of Israel paid a very high tollphysically, psychologically, and economically-as a result of the missile attacks by Hezbollah, yet tensions between Jews and Arabs within Israel were on the rise. This was the result of at least two related dynamics: First, the war had created an enormous challenge to Israeli democracy, particularly as regards the question of granting rights to minorities who at least to some extent endorse the activities of the enemies of Israel. Second, during this period, when the war was brought home and civilians were the immediate victims of the warfare, existential insecurity was at its peak.
The war was followed by a relatively calm year in Israel. Survey 4 was conducted ten months following the war, in June 2007. During the time that elapsed following the war, the human toll was minimal; two Israelis were killed and a very few were injured by rockets launched on the southwestern parts of Israel by the Palestinian Hamas, the Islamic Jihad or by Palestinian terrorists acting in Israel (Israel Foreign Affairs Ministry, 2007) . 6 Hence the months prior to Survey 4 can be seen as a calm period with a lessened sense of existential insecurity.
Measures
In all four surveys, we used an essentially similar structured 25-minute questionnaire. The questionnaires included measures of emotions (hatred, fear, anger), threat perception, political intolerance, and demographic and political information in regard to participants' income, educational attainment, political stands, and religiosity. Additionally, different relevant concepts (e.g., democratic values, ideology gap, authoritarianism, and ingroup identity), were measured. Scales were computed based on an average-extracting procedure.
Political intolerance. To account for the dynamics of political intolerance in Israel, we use two methods which apply to the unique conflict situation as well as to the pluralistic intolerance pattern. 7 In the first method, all intolerance questions are targeted at one specific group. In Stouffer's classic work (1955), he asked Americans about their willingness to grant political rights to Communists. Given the intractable conflict and based on previous studies, the Israeli counterpart would probably be PCIs (Canetti-Nisim & Pedahzur, 2003; Shamir & Sagiv-Schifter, 2006) .
The second method, which was introduced by Sullivan and his colleagues (1979, 1981, 1982) , is based on the notion of content-free intolerance, where 6 To further illustrate the notion of existential security in the months prior to Survey 4, as opposed to other recent periods in Israel, we could also compare the recent average human toll to the climactic years of the Second Intifada (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) , when the monthly toll resulting from terrorist attacks within Israeli society was 20.45 on average. 7 There is disagreement over the pluralistic versus nonpluralistic theory of intolerance (Sullivan et al., 1981 , vs. Seligson & Caspi, 1983 and the related measures. The findings are inconclusive as well. At least one Israeli study (Shamir & Sagiv-Schifter, 2006 ) had compared political tolerance levels in Israel by using both the content-free and the noncontent-free measures. The results suggested that PCIs are the least popular regardless of the method employed. Yet other studies have found that non-Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union were less popular than PCIs.
participants select their least liked group. By enabling selection and adjusting the questions to the participants' most disliked group, we can neutralize the specific content of intergroup relations. This strategy overcomes specific trends in negative attitudes towards specific groups (e.g., illegal Mexican immigrants in the United States today) and provides a more precise reflection of the general dynamic of political intolerance.
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Political intolerance towards either the least-liked group or PCIs was assessed using six-item (Surveys 1 and 2) or four-item (Surveys 3 and 4) scales that were employed in studies in Israel and elsewhere (Shamir & Sagiv-Schifter, 2006; Sullivan et al., 1993) . Items were answered on a scale of 1 (very strongly disagree) to 6 (very strongly agree), and questions focused on the following issues: the [party/group] should be outlawed; [party/group] should be allowed to speak on television; elected to the Israeli Parliament; vote in national elections; ought to have their phones tapped (Surveys 1 and 2 only); allowed to be a candidate for prime minister (Surveys 1 and 2 only). Internal reliability-Cronbach's alphafor political intolerance was excellent in all four surveys (a1 = .85, a2 = .84, a3 = 84, a4 = .84). It is important to note that several items were reversed so that high values indicate political intolerance.
Emotional Variables-Hatred, Anger, and Fear. The assumption underlying the construction of these scales was that group-based negative emotions are a temporary response to specific harmful events. Accordingly, items had to relate to specific emotionally stimulating events. Therefore, in the first two surveys (panel design) following the selection of the least liked group, a short preliminary preface was presented to the participants. The group-focused script was aimed at reminding the participant of actions recently committed by outgroup members. (For elaboration regarding the paragraphs, see 9 Once they had listened to the script, participants were asked to recall the thoughts and feelings they experienced immediately after hearing about the actions mentioned: "Try to re-experience the feelings you felt when you heard about these actions and declarations at the time." In the case of Surveys 3 and 4, instead of listening to the script, participants were asked to think about the behavior and statements of PCIs and their leaders during the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War. Accordingly, they were asked to indicate their feelings towards the outgroup on a series of eight six-point 8 Participants were presented with a list of outgroups and were asked to select their most distant or least liked group. Participants who refused to point to such a group were asked to select the group with whom they identify the least. The list of potential outgroups was based upon previous studies of political tolerance in Israel (e.g., Shamir & Sagiv Schifter, 2006) and consisted of 12 groups. For clarity considerations we combined the groups into the following five clusters: "Arabs," "extreme leftists," "seculars," "ultra-orthodox," and "extreme rightists." The distribution of the selection of outgroups was as follows: 37.4% (N = 313) chose Arab groups as their most distant outgroup; 26.2% (N = 219) chose extreme-right groups; 14.3% (N = 120) secular groups; 13% (N = 109) ultraorthodox ones; and 9.1% (N = 76) extreme-left groups. 9 The short script did not introduce new information but rather was a reminder of common public knowledge.
rating scales. These items concerned group-based hatred (hostility, hatred; a1 = .70, a2 = .72, a3 = .82, a4 = .80), anger (angry, irritated, and revolted; a1 = .87, a2 = .91, a3 = .86, a4 = .76), and fear (afraid, scared, and worried; a1 = .85, a2 = .88, a3 = .83, a4 = .75).
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Perceived Threat. Our main control variable was measured in all surveys by a three-item scale that is often used in Israel (e.g., Sullivan et al., 1985) . Each participant was asked whether and to what extent (1 = not at all; 6 = very much) their least liked group endangers Israel's security, Israeli democracy, and Israel's Jewish character. Internal reliability was quite high (a1 = .74, a2 = .77, a3 = .88, a4 = .88).
Demographic and Political Indicators. Self-evaluation of income compared to the average in Israel (1 = much below average; 5 = much above average), educational attainment (1 = elementary, 2 = high-school, 3 = post-high school [nonuniversity/college], 4 = university/college student, 5 = university/college degree), self-definition of political ideology (1 = extreme left/dovish, to 5 = extreme right/hawkish), and self-definition regarding level of religiosity (1 = secular, 2 = traditional, 3 = religious, 4 = very religious).
Before we turn to the analysis we would like to account for a recurrent past claim regarding some overlap between hatred, threat, and intolerance (Raijman, Semyonov, & Schmidt, 2003) as well as between hatred, anger, and fear (Marcus & Mackuen, 1993) . To confirm the distinctiveness of each of those variables, two sets of exploratory factor analysis were conducted using principal component analysis with Varimax rotation 11 and Kaiser Normalization. The results presented in Table 2 show that each of the two analyses yielded a very clear three-factor solution that is compatible with our preliminary construction of the scales. In other words, though it can be assumed that hatred, anger, fear, intolerance, and perceived threat are closely related, each of them represents separate and unique content. Table 3 reveals high levels of perceived threat, anger, and fear towards the selected outgroups, moderate levels of political intolerance and relatively low levels of hatred. In both surveys, the highest levels of all negative emotions as well as the highest levels of political intolerance and perceived threat were found among those who chose PCIs as their most disliked group. For example, 69% of those individuals believe that the disliked party or group should be outlawed, and more than half (50.2%) think that PCIs should not be allowed to vote in national elections.
An Emotional Model for Predicting Political Intolerance
Those who selected extreme rightists as the least liked group also exhibit low levels of political tolerance. Almost two thirds (59.4%) oppose the possibility of an extreme rightist candidate for prime minister, and 53.9% want to prevent any TV appearance by extreme rightists. That finding contradicts the democratic and liberal stereotype of the left-wing public in Israel, yet it seems to be a direct reaction to disengagement events in which members of the Israeli extreme right have violently attacked soldiers and politicians.
The cognitive and emotional pattern of the people who chose leftists, ultraorthodox, and seculars as their most disliked group is complex. On the one hand, they present moderate to high levels of perceived threat, anger, and fear towards the selected groups, yet, on the other hand, the levels of hatred and intolerance they present are very low. The results imply that individuals want to change the situation, but at the same time see the selected outgroup as part of their collective and, hence, don't want to exclude them from the Jewish-Israeli public sphere.
Above and beyond the selected disliked groups, positive and significant correlations (at the level of p < .001) were found between political intolerance and the three negative emotions as well as between political intolerance and perceived threat in both surveys. The highest correlations in both surveys were found between intolerance and hatred (r1 = .46, r2 = .50) and between intolerance and perceived threat (r1 = .46, r2 = .43). Lower, but significant correlations were found between political intolerance and anger (r1 = .31, r2 = .33) and between intolerance and fear (r1 = .29, r2 = .33). In addition, significant but low correlations were found between political intolerance and a rightist political stand in Survey 1 (r1 = .12, p < .05) and level of education in both surveys (r1 = -.12, r2 = -.11, p < .05). Correlations between the three emotions were high, yet corresponded with the results of the factor analyses; none of them exceed the critical value of 0.7, which is the accepted level for multicollinearity (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Bagozzi, Yi, & Phillips, 1991) .
Does Hatred Predict Political Intolerance?
To evaluate the independent effect of each variable on political intolerance, while controlling for the effects of other independent variables, we ran three steps of multiple regression analysis. First, political intolerance measured in Survey 1 was regressed on independent variables measured in the same survey. Second, the same procedure was conducted using measurements (dependent and independent) from Survey 2. Third, we regressed political intolerance from the second survey on independent variables measured on the same occasion and on political intolerance measured in the first survey.
Hatred and perceived threat are the two most important predictors of political intolerance (Table 4 ). Survey 1 shows that perceived ideological distance may play an important role in reducing tolerance. Most importantly, illustrating the validity of hypothesis 1, the results of all three steps show that when all other relevant variables are controlled for, hatred is the only emotional variable that affects political intolerance. Moreover, the results of the third step show that when controlling for the first waves' levels of political intolerance, hatred is by far the most important predictor of political intolerance.
12 12 The nonsignificant relations between sociodemographic variables (and mainly levels of education) and political intolerance seem contradictory to previous findings. Yet further analyses showed that such association exists in all of our surveys, but it is qualified by the stronger association between perceived threat, hatred, and intolerance. That finding corresponds with previous works that show that the effect of sociodemographic variables on intolerance is frequently mediated by stronger psychological constructs like threat or hatred (see Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, & Pedahzur, 2007; Sullivan et al., 1985) .
Does Hatred Mediate the Effect of Anger and Fear on Political Intolerance?
Inclusion of perceived threat and hatred dwarfs the influence of other potential predictors on intolerance. This implies a mediating model, where hatred (and threat) mediates other effects on political intolerance. To create such a model we used structural equation modeling (SEM) with latent variables, using version 6.0 of the AMOS program which enables a full information maximum likelihood procedure (Arbuckle, 2003) . 13 The exogenous variables in the model were anger, fear, ideological distance, political stand, and level of religiosity, which were measured in Survey 1. To test for claims on causal effects, which are based on the assumption that the appearance of the independent variables preceded the one 13 The usual approach is to estimate structural relationships among latent variables that are free of measurement errors. In our study, the multi-item scales were treated as parcels (Bandalos, 2002) of each construct because of the large number of observed variables relative to the size of the sample and to the structural theoretical parameters. In accordance with standard representation, we depicted the observed variables as rectangles. For simplification, error terms and covariance between exogenous variables were omitted from the figure. The fit of the models was assessed by means of four criteria: (1) fit measures (in addition to the traditional c 2 , based on Hu and Bentler (1999) , we prefer to report the NFI in combination with RMSEA); (2) comparisons of nested models (Bollen, 1989) based on the difference in c 2 ; (3) the magnitude and direction of the path coefficients (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1994) , including Sobel tests for indirect effects (Preacher & Hayes, 2004) ; and (4) explained variance. Finally, a covariance matrix among the research variables formed the input for the path analysis. of the mediating variables, endogenous variables were measured in Survey 2. In addition, in order to provide support for a cautious suggestion of causality, under the assumption that the antecedent precedes the consequent in time, we controlled for the level of political intolerance measured in Survey 1. The measurement model had an acceptable fit to the data (c 2 /df = 3.09, p < .00; NFI = .94; CFI = .96; RMSEA = .05). These findings strengthened the results of the exploratory factor analysis, which were displayed earlier. Three structural models were advanced. Model 1 was based upon Hypothesis 2 and included only indirect paths (see Figure 1) . Model 2 included only direct paths to political intolerance. Model 3 was an integrated model which included direct paths as well as indirect effects via hatred and threat perception. Liked Group. Note: p < .05*, p < .01**, p < .001***; standardized significant coefficients are reported between the fit measures of the three models showed that the indirect model (Model 1) showed the best fit to the data. 14 Not surprisingly, the results of the best-fitted model show that the most prominent antecedent of political intolerance in Survey 2 is political intolerance in Survey 1. This finding indicates the stability of political tolerance over time. Moreover, Figure 1 shows that apart from intolerance measured in Survey 1, hatred is the only variable in the model which directly affects political intolerance (.20). Perceived threat, on the other hand, has only an indirect effect on political intolerance, through hatred (.20 ¥ .54 = .11). It is worth noting that additional models, in which a direct path between perceived threat and intolerance was tested, did not show any significant results. It can be suggested, therefore, that the substantial direct effect of perceived threat on intolerance that was found in the great majority of previous studies in the field was, at least to some extent, a result of the absence of the important emotional factor of hatred from most of these models.
The results also show that all the effects of the exogenous variables and particularly of anger (.20 ¥ .22 = .04) and fear (.44 ¥ .54 ¥ .20 = .05) on political intolerance are mediated by hatred. While anger (and level of religiosity 15 ) directly influences the level of hatred, fear (and ideological distance and political stand) does so through the mediation of perceived threat. In other words, anger will turn to political intolerance only if it directly affects hatred. On the other hand, the process of transforming fear into intolerance is even more complicated. It has to affect the perception of threat, which influences the levels of hatred, which in turn induces levels of intolerance. Whereas these indirect effects are weak, they are the only effects of fear and anger on intolerance.
Does Political Sophistication Moderate the Effect of Hatred on Political Intolerance?
With a better sense of the ways in which negative emotions affect intolerance, we needed to examine whether emotions work differently on intolerance among sophisticated and unsophisticated citizenry. To do so, we presented the participants of surveys 1 and 2 with six basic questions that test political knowledge in 14 Model 1 (c 2 /df = 4.13, p < .00; NFI = .91; CFI = .93; RMSEA = .06); Model 2 (c 2 /df = 4.99, p < .00; NFI = .89; CFI = .91; RMSEA = .07); Model 3 (c 2 /df = 5.03, p < .00; NFI = .89; CFI = .91; RMSEA = .07). 15 We controlled for religion, which has been reported to be a robust predictor of intolerance (Nunn, Crockett, & Williams, 1978; Stouffer, 1955) ; been left out of the analysis altogether (Davis & Silver, 2004; Gibson, 1992; Marcus et al., 1995) ; or been poorly measured (Stouffer, 1955; Sullivan et al., 1982) . We find that the negative direct relationship typically demonstrated between doctrinal orthodoxy and political tolerance does not manifest and that religion is insignificant compared to other determinants of political tolerance regardless of contextual conditions. This finding is consistent with two recent works that advocate more complex measuring and modeling of religion in the context of democratic norms and values (Canetti-Nisim, 2004; Eisenstein, 2006). reference to Israeli politics. 16 In general, the participants exhibited moderate to high levels of political sophistication (M = .62; SD = .28).
Based on the actual midrange grades of the participants on the political sophistication scale, we divided the sample into two groups. Then we conducted separate regression analyses for each of the groups (sophisticated: N = 151, unsophisticated: N = 279). In each of the analyses (see Table 5 , left columns), political intolerance on the second survey was regressed on independent variables from the same survey and on political intolerance from the first survey. The results show different patterns for explaining political intolerance among each of the groups. By and large, political intolerance among unsophisticated individuals is highly influenced by the emotions they feel in response to particular events, and mainly by group-based hatred (Hypothesis 3). In addition, while perceived threat has a minor 16 The questions were: Who is the leader advancing the "territorial exchange" plan between Israel and the Palestinians? Which of the following parties display a tendency towards a socialist-democratic approach? Of the following parties, which is the most "rightist"? For each question, we graded 0 for wrong answer and 1 for correct answer. After averaging the grades of the six items, the scale ranged from 0 (= low political sophistication) to 1 (= high political sophistication). effect on intolerance among this group, the effect of political intolerance in the first survey is much higher.
On the other hand, the results imply that levels of political intolerance among sophisticated individuals are more stable, less influenced by transitory emotions or threats, and more related to the attachment to their ingroup. More specifically, while hatred and fear do not affect intolerance at all among this group, anger has a minor, but significant effect on it. While anger induces political intolerance among sophisticated individuals it has the opposite effect on intolerance among unsophisticated individuals. In addition, ingroup identity slightly influences levels of intolerance among sophisticated individuals, while perceived threat does not affect them at all.
To ratify this pattern of the results we used the entire sample (N = 430) and regressed political intolerance on the same independent variables as well as on all possible interaction effects between the continuous measure of sophistication and the independent variables. Corresponding with the results of the split analysis, the results show ( Table 5 left column) that only political intolerance (T1), group-based hatred, and the interaction between hatred and sophistication significantly affected intolerance (T2).
17 These results further validate our assumption that political sophistication moderates the effect of group-based hatred on political intolerance.
Does Existential Insecurity Moderate the Effect of Hatred on Political Intolerance?
We used Study 3 and Study 4 to test our fourth hypothesis, which focused on how the relationships between emotions and intolerance differed in routine times and times of war. The descriptive statistics for the main research variables during the two surveys raise some interesting points. First, no significant differences were found between the levels of political intolerance (M = 3.24, SD = 1.64(3); M = 3.23, SD = 1.11(4); t = .13, p = .90) and perceived threat (M = 3.87, SD = 1.67(3); M = 3.72, SD = 1.68(4); t = 1.58, p = .11) on the surveys that were conducted under such different conditions. Counterintuitively, however, levels of all three negative emotions were higher in the survey done under routine conditions as compared to the wartime one (hatred (M = 3.18, SD = 1.87(3); M = 3.60, SD = 1.67(4); t = 4.23, p < .001), anger (M = 3.72, SD = 1.86(3); M = 4.20, SD = 1.50(4); t = 5.13, p < .001), and fear (M = 3.13, SD = 1.84(3); M = 3.70, SD = 1.57(4); t = 5.77, p < .001)). One explanation for this surprising finding, to be further elaborated in the Discussion, is that during the war the negative emotional resources focused on the enemy outside the country, rather than on the perceived enemy within.
The question which remains open is whether and how the state of security, or lack thereof, influenced the effect of emotions on political intolerance. The results of Table 6 , which presents a multiple regression analysis of political intolerance on all relevant variables during routine times and wartime, show that the war atmosphere clearly made a difference. More specifically, as predicted in Hypothesis 4, the effect of hatred on political intolerance is much more substantial in wartime than in a routine period. On the other hand, the effect of perceived threat on political intolerance is high and quite similar in both surveys. It is interesting to note that while political orientation had an effect on intolerance in both periods, level of education had a negative affect on intolerance only in wartime and level of religiosity had the opposite effect only in the no-war/routine period.
Conclusions and Discussion
We examined the relationship between three group-based negative emotions-fear, anger, and hatred-and political intolerance in Israel. In particular, we examined how hatred and other negative emotions were related to political intolerance by examining similar models during an election campaign, wartime, and routine situations. Four population-based surveys have unequivocally shown that hatred is an antecedent of greater levels of political intolerance. In line with our hypotheses, this finding was substantiated when other negative emotions-fear and anger, or threat perception-were controlled for. Anger was conducive to political intolerance only when hatred mediated the relationship. Fear, however, was conducive to political intolerance only when both threat perception and hatred mediated the relationship. The role of hatred in inducing political intolerance was more substantial during a period of heightened existential threat, and among politically unsophisticated individuals. Group-based hatred is a distinct concept; it is related but clearly differs from fear, anger, threat, or intolerance. Furthermore, it carries independent theoretical importance and political implications (Halperin, 2008) . These findings add to the conceptual distinctions between threat and intolerance (e.g., Canetti-Nisim et al., 2007) , and question those pointing to limited differences between the political consequences of negative emotions such as anger, fear, or hatred (e.g., Marcus & Mackuen, 1993) .
Although there has been a recent flurry of empirical studies on intolerance, exclusionism, or xenophobia among people living under war and terror (e.g., Canetti-Nisim et al., 2007; Huddy et al., 2007; Huddy et al., 2005; Inglehart et al., 2006) , for idiosyncratic reasons, they all fail to develop robust measures of groupbased emotions or study whether group-based hatred is conducive to political behavior. This study joins others (Halperin, 2008) to fill these gaps.
We were able to point to an interesting pathway between anger and fear, on the one hand, and political intolerance on the other. Both are incongruently dependent on the mediation of hatred. Anger tends to call for confrontation with the source of anger, a confrontation which is often aggressive and appears in different guises, partly because anger involves elevated coping ability and appraisals of relative strength. When ingroup members are angry with outgroup members because of their perceived misdeeds, they are willing to retaliate, whether by denying civil rights (Berkowitz, 1993) or by first seeking a way to change or educate the source of anger and as a last resort turning to aggression (Fischer & Roseman, 2007) . However, there is no verification-in this study or elsewhere-of substantive direct links between anger and intolerance. This study finds that if there is hatred that evolves from anger, it will activate increased endorsement of political intolerance.
In contrast to anger, fear entails avoidance. Those who fear members of outgroups will probably try to stay away from those who invoke fear (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Frijda et al., 1989) . Neither political literature on tolerance nor psychological literature on emotions present evidence that fear is directly conducive to intolerance. To be translated to endorsement of political intolerance, fear seems to need another factor to exacerbate it. This study builds on previous studies that introduce increased threat perception as one outcome of fear (Gibson & Bingham, 1982; Marcus et al., 1995) , but departs from these studies by adding hatred as a link between threat and intolerance.
We find that hatred is also stronger than well-established predictorsdemocratic norms, psychological authoritarianism, and threat perceptionsderived mainly from the groundbreaking work on pluralistic intolerance (Sullivan et al., 1982) . If any single factor is likely to drive people to cede civil liberties, it is perceptions of the threat posed by their political enemies (Gibson, 2006) . This project suggests that hatred is as good a predictor as threat perception; threat perceptions incite hatred, and hatred in turn is conducive to political intolerance.
However, this study finds that political knowledge is a form of immunization from the effects of hatred on political intolerance. Anger is somewhat an outlier among other negative emotions in terms of its links to cognitive sophistication. Angry people become intolerant, regardless of their level of political sophistication. Fear is a great motivator for realignment and rethinking. Unlike anxiety or severe stress, which can paralyze cognitive abilities, fear drives people to seek new alternatives by acquiring new knowledge. Fearful people will not be supportive of intolerance, unless they score low on political sophistication. Those not exposed to political information or have limited intellectual capacity to obtain and analyze political information should be particularly prudent about hatred and its consequences. This study makes an important contribution to the study of political sophistication, adding a crucial refinement to works that concluded that emotions are crucial in the political decision-making process, regardless of the level of sophistication (e.g., Geva & Sirtin, 2006) .
Again, the single most important predictor of intolerance, perceptions of the threat posed by one's political enemies, is a predictor in nearly all studies of intolerance (Gibson, 2006 ). Yet in contrast to situations of hypothetical threat, the Hezbollah missiles aimed at Israel in the summer of 2006 posed an immediate, substantive threat to Israelis. In our study of the period, we confirmed that threat perception is an important factor that drives people towards denying the rights of threatening outgroups. Separated from anger, fear, and threat, with level of existential threat as a moderator, hatred was the second best predictor of political intolerance. Regardless of the period under examination, hatred was related to greater intolerance, although in the period immediately following the war hatred was a three-fold better predictor than 10 months after the war.
Although interesting, the current findings should be treated with some caution, mainly due to certain limitations of the study design, which suffers from the well known weaknesses of a correlative study; that is, correlational data do not provide strong evidence for causality between the surveyed constructs. We do think, however, that the integration of the four unique nation-wide representative samples, the prospective design and the analyses of the data using structural equation modeling, provide preliminary support for the proposed causal model. These preliminary findings should be further validated in the future, using a complementary experimental design.
This study covers much new ground, building on but also departing from the groundbreaking line of work by Sullivan and his colleagues (1981) . This study reaffirms Kuklinski et al.'s (1991) general finding that "gut feelings" affect political intolerance, as well as Sullivan et al.'s notion that perceptions of threat are key to any attempt to learn about political tolerance. Yet our model departs from the latter by presenting a deeper, more differentiate examination of the role of discrete negative emotions, most notably hatred, in increasing political intolerance among different groups of individuals in different contexts.
We theorized that alongside threat perceptions, group-based hatred would enhance our understanding of political intolerance. We not only succeed in distinguishing between seemingly inseparable negative emotions, but we also show that hatred plays a unique role in fostering political intolerance. Unlike fear, which induces a step back from outgroup members, and anger, which may induce a step towards them, hatred is particularly dangerous: an emotion that involves willingness to completely restrain or control the target of hatred. These findings contribute to a growing body of literature demonstrating that negative emotions can have devastating and irreversible political outcomes. Regardless of the direction of future research, it is our hope that people internalize the fact that hatred can have severe consequences in the political realm. This internalization in turn, should lead social scientists in general and political psychologists in particular to materialize a much broader research aimed at identifying the nature of hatred and the ways to moderate its influence of human nature.
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